The Dynamic Adjustment of Central Banks' Target Interest Rate: The Case of the ECB by Paulo Ricardo Mota & Abel Fernandes
n. 613 Dez 2018
ISSN: 0870-8541
The Dynamic Adjustment of Central Banks'
Target Interest Rate: The Case of the ECB
Paulo R. Mota 1,2
Abel L. Costa Fernandes 1,3
1 FEP-UP, School of Economics and Management, University of Porto
2 CEF.UP, Research Center in Economics and Finance, University of Porto
3 NIFIP, Núcleo de Investigação em Finanças Públicas e Política Monetária, University of
Porto
1 
 
THE DYNAMIC ADJUSTMENT OF CENTRAL BANKS’ TARGET INTEREST 
RATE: THE CASE OF THE ECB 
 
  
Paulo R. Mota1 
University of Porto – School of Economics and Business and CEF.UP2 
 
 
Abel L. C. Fernandes   
University of Porto – School of Economics and Business and NIFIP3  
 
   
 
 
Abstract 
   
 
A fundamental aspect of the ECB’s monetary policy is that it aims to pursue price stability 
“over the medium term.” However, the ECB has not defined the medium term with 
reference to a predetermined horizon, retaining some flexibility with regard to the exact 
time frame. The objective of this paper is to shed some light on how the horizon of price 
stability is being achieved in practice, in a context where the ECB faces convex and non-
convex costs of adjusting the target interest rate. We assume that ECB’s monetary policy 
follows an average flexible inflation target framework, and we analyse the R2 of an 
equation where the target interest rate is specified as a function of the j-period window 
over which average inflation rate is measured. Target interest rate inertia is incorporate 
through a switching interest rate equation based on the play model of hysteresis. We have 
found that the ECB is targeting the key interest rate over a seven years window, implying 
that the ECB is following a hybrid approach to price stability in line with average inflation 
target. We also have found hysteresis effects in the dynamic adjustment of ECB´s target 
interest rate.   
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
According to Article 127(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union, “the primary objective of the Eurosystem shall be to maintain price stability.” The 
ECB has defined price stability as a year-on-year increase in the Harmonised Index of 
Consumer Prices for the euro area of below 2% over the medium term.4   
A fundamental aspect of the ECB’s monetary policy is that it aims to pursue price 
stability “over the medium term”. This reflects the idea that monetary policy should not 
attempt to fine-tune developments in inflation over short time horizons. Therefore, some 
short-term volatility in inflation is acceptable (see ECB, 2011, p. 68).     
The ECB monetary policy strategy, as stated above, is in fact rather ambiguous. 
The ECB has not defined the medium term with reference to a predetermined horizon, 
retaining some flexibility with regard to the exact time frame. According to ECB (2011) 
it is not advisable to specify ex-ante a precise horizon for the conduct of monetary policy, 
since the transmission mechanism spans a variable, uncertain period of time. 
The ECB’s mandate is explicitly formulated in terms of a price stability objective 
rather than in terms of an inflation target – entailing a quasi-automatic reaction to 
deviations of forecast inflation from the target over a predetermined time horizon, 
typically of one or two years (see ECB, 2011). On the contrary, it bases its actions on a 
more flexible strategy both as regards the economic variables taken into consideration 
and the relevant time horizon for responding to shocks in the economy. For example, 
Domingo Solans former member of the Executive Board of the ECB stated early in 2000 
that “None of the inflation targeting characteristics […] can be applied to the ECB's 
monetary policy strategy. A quantitative definition of stability is not an inflation target in 
conceptual and practical terms. It is rather a specification of the objective established in 
the Maastricht Treaty. […] The ECB is, certainly, obliged to comply with its objective in 
a medium term perspective, but its monetary policy decisions do not ‘target’ it, in the 
                                                             
4 The definition makes it clear that inflation above 2% is not consistent with price stability. It also implies 
that very low inflation rates, and especially deflation, are not consistent with price stability either (ECB, 
2011, p. 9).   
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sense that the ECB will not react mechanically if the HICP increase goes beyond the limit 
of the definition.”5 
The former president of the ECB Jean Claude Trichet also clarified the medium-
term orientation of the monetary policy by stating that there is no fixed time horizon over 
which price stability has to be re-established, which avoid overly activist and ambitious 
attempts to fine-tune inflation outcomes. 6 
Having in mind that the ECB uses the main refinancing open market operations 
fixed interest rate as the operating mechanism for monetary policy,7 the ambiguity of the 
ECB monetary policy strategy raises the question of how the decisions regarding this key 
interest rate are taken.  
 
The objective of this paper is to shed some light on how the horizon of price 
stability is being achieved in practice, in a context where the ECB faces convex and non-
convex costs of adjusting the target interest rate, and operates in an uncertainty 
environment. 
For that purpose, we assume that ECB’s monetary policy follows an average 
flexible inflation target framework, allowing constrained discretion, and we analyse the 
R2 of an equation where the target interest rate is specified as a function of the j-period 
window over which average inflation rate is measured.  
Target interest rate inertia is incorporate through a switching interest rate equation 
based on the play model of hysteresis. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 deals with the 
differences and consequences of price-level targeting versus inflation target. Section 3 
discusses the fundaments of the target Central Bank interest rate persistence. Section 4 
offers preliminary empirical evidence on ECB key interest rates change, describes the 
details of the empirical strategy, and the data set. Section 5 presents the estimation results, 
and Section 6 concludes.      
 
                                                             
5 “Monetary policy under inflation targeting.” Contribution presented by Eugenio Domingo Solans, 
Member of the Governing Council and the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, at the Fourth 
Annual Conference of Banco Central de Chile, Santiago de Chile, 1 December 2000. 
6 See the Speech by Jean-Claude Trichet, former President of the European Central Bank, delivered at the 
Center for Financial Studies' key event, Frankfurt, 20 November 2003. 
7 From January 1999 until June 2000, the ECB targeted the fixed rate of the main refining operations, from 
July 2000 to July 2007 it switched to the minimum bid rate of the variable rate tenders, and from that date 
on the ECB is targeting again the fixed rate of the main refining operations. 
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2. INFLATION VS PRICE-LEVEL TARGETING 
 
The final goal of the monetary policy of the ECB is price stability. Taken literally, 
price stability implies price level-targeting with the target price level rising over time at 
below (but close to 2%). However, ECB monetary policy is usually described in 
macroeconomic models as a flexible inflation target by means of a Taylor rule variant, 
even with ECB officials stating that the monetary strategy of the ECB is not an inflation 
targeting. 
The essential distinction between the two regimes lies on how the Central Bank 
reacts to changes in inflation (see, e.g., Ambler, 2009). Under inflation target the Central 
Bank reacts to bring inflation back to its target rate. A transitory increase of the inflation 
rate may not imply a reaction of the Central Bank. It originates, however, a permanent 
increase in the price level. Thus, transitory inflation shocks have a cumulative impact on 
the price level. Differently, under price-level targeting the Central Bank reacts to 
deviations of the price level from its target, implying that an inflationary shock in one 
period should be followed by a deflationary one in the next. In this case, the price level 
should be stationary around the trend given by the target value chosen for inflation. 
At the present no Central Bank follows explicitly a price-level targeting strategy.8 
The main arguments against its adoption are: the idea that price level path stability would 
induce increased volatility of inflation and output compared with a regime of inflation 
targeting; and the inability of the Central Bank to avoid a painful monetary policy 
tightening following supply shocks that drive up inflation (see e.g., Fischer, 1995). 
Nonetheless, recent literature have appointed several advantages of the former 
strategy.9  
Firstly, the stationarity of the price level around its specified path, limits 
uncertainty regarding the future price level,10 facilitates the forecasting of the real value 
of payments flow involved in long-term contracts, and therefore reduces the risk 
premiums demanded by lenders (Vestin, 2006).  
Secondly, it reduces the redistributive effects of unexpected price-level changes. 
                                                             
8 The exception was Sweden in the 1930s (see Guender and Oh, 2006, for an historical perspective). 
9 See, e.g., Ambler (2009), Deutsche Bundesbank, Montly Report - January 2010, Giannoni (2014), and 
Hatcher and Minford (2016) for a survey.  
10 See, e.g., Batini and Yates (2003). 
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Thirdly, it may reduce the risk of reaching the zero interest rate lower bound, as a 
drop in the price level to below the target path leads to a rise in inflation expectations 
(see, e.g., Eggertson and Woodford, 2003, and Wolman, 2003). In this line, Bernanke 
(2017) recently proposed a modified monetary policy framework that implies the 
adoption of a temporary flexible price-level targeting that would work only in periods in 
which interest rates are constrained by the zero lower bound. In this way the need to 
tighten monetary policy in the face of temporary inflation shocks away from the ZLB 
would be avoided.  
Fourthly, although from one point of view, price-level targeting may lead to higher 
inflation volatility, and thus to higher product and employment volatility (in the presence 
of nominal rigidities),11 from another perspective it may contribute to macroeconomic 
stability. Indeed, if expectations are forward looking (or if there is substantial endogenous 
output persistence12), price-level targeting cause expectations to move (automatically) in 
the opposite direction following a deviation of the price-level from the defined path, 
which requires a weaker monetary policy response (see, e.g., Svensson, 1999, Nessén and 
Vestin, 2005, Vestin, 2006, Guender and Oh, 2006, Ambler, 2009, and Giannoni, 2014). 
Also, Svensson and Woodford (2005), Röisland (2006), and Gaspar et al. (2007) have 
assessed the performance price-targeting framework in the baseline New-Keynesian 
model and conclude that it delivers lower inflation variability for any given level of output 
gap variability.  
The defined ‘medium run’ horizon for price stability indicates that the ECB is not 
following a pure price-targeting neither a pure inflation target, but instead an ‘average 
inflation target,’ by which the objective is to stabilized average inflation measured over 
several periods. Indeed, Nessén and Vestin (2005) show that under discretion, targeting 
average inflation can yield a superior outcome to both former strategies. 
 Let us assume that the Central Bank aims at stabilizing inflation around the target, 
ߨ∗, but also put some weight on stabilizing the real economy. Thus, it minimizes a period 
quadratic loss function defined as: 
 
ܮ൫ߨത௝,௧ ,ݔ௧൯ = ଵଶ ቂ൫ߨത௝,௧ − ߨ∗൯ଶ + ߣݔ௧ଶቃ                                                                         (1) 
 
                                                             
11 See, e.g., Batini and Yates (2003). 
12 This happens because in an inflation-targeting regime inflation responds on the future path of output, 
whereas under price level targeting inflation depends on the change in output.   
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Where ݔ௧ is the output gap, ߣ is the relative weight of output stabilization , and ߨത௝,௧ is the 
average inflation rate defined as:  
 
ߨത௝,௧ = ଵ௝ ∑ ߨ௧ି௦ =௝ିଵ௦ୀ଴ ଵ௝ ൫݌௧ − ݌௧ି௝൯                                                                          (2) 
 
Where ݌௧ is the logarithm of the price level in period ݐ. This policy lies between price-
level targeting and inflation target. If ݆ = 1, we have the standard one period inflation 
target. Letting ݆ become very large (݆ → ∞) correspond to having a price-level 
targeting.13 Thus, average inflation target shares with the price-level targeting the 
property that the price level remains anchored to a predetermined path. The longer the 
period over which inflation is averaged, the more average inflation targeting resemble 
price-level targeting.14 
According to Ha (2000), Smets (2000; 2003) and Akram (2010), the optimal 
monetary policy horizon depends on: i) the structure of the economy, including the length 
of the monetary policy transmission lag; ii) the desire of the Central Bank to avoid 
excessive interest rate and output volatility, and in particular on the weight put on this 
objectives in the loss function; and iii) the nature of the shocks. 
In general, the literature shows that the optimal policy horizon is: a) about twice 
as long for price level objective compared with inflation objective (Smets, 2000; 2003, 
and Akram, 2010); b) longer the greater the weight put on secondary objectives like 
minimising the output gap and interest rate variability (Smets, 2003); and c) longer the 
higher the degree of forward-lookingness in the pricing equations and the greater the slope 
of the Phillips Curve (Smets, 2003).       
An obvious question is what is the width of the window, ݆, used to calculate 
average inflation, which is associated to the ‘medium term’ concept of price stability.  
This is ultimately an empirical issue, and it is addressed in Section 4.  
 
 
 
 
                                                             
13 Note that the equivalence between price level targeting and inflation targeting with an infinite ݆ window, 
holds strictly only when the output gap weight in the Central Bank loss function is equal to zero (Néssen, 
2002, p. 326).   
14 See, e.g., Nessén (2002), Batini and Yates (2003), and Nessén and Vestin (2005). 
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3. INTEREST RATES SMOOTHING 
  
Official Interest rates smoothing is a widely recognizable characteristic of 
monetary policy in many countries,15 and refers to the tendency for Central Banks to 
adjust key interest rates gradually in the same direction, and with relatively few reversals 
(see, e.g., Lowe and Ellis, 1997, Goodhart 1999, Srour, 2001, and Bernanke, 2004).16  
This type of key policy interest rate behaviour is typically captured in models by 
some form of partial adjustment mechanism with the Central Bank adjusting the key 
policy rate slowly towards the desired level (see, e.g., McCallum, 1995, Clarida and 
Gertler, 1996, and Clarida et al., 2000). The policy rule usually takes the form: 
 
݅௧ = ߩ݅௧ିଵ + (1 − ߩ)݅௧∗                                                                                           (3) 
 
Where the level of the key Central Bank interest rate in period ݐ, ݅௧, is specified as a 
weighted average of the current desired level, ݅௧∗, and last period actual value, ݅௧ିଵ. Based 
on historical data, estimates of ߩ are often in the range 0.8 - 0.9, implying a slow 
adjustment of the policy rate to its fundamental determinants (see, e.g., Rudebush, 2002; 
2005, and Gerlach-Kristen, 2004).).       
There are two competing hypothesis to explain interest rates persistence. 
On one hand, the literature refers to an extrinsic or exogenous cause to the Central 
Bank behaviour. According to this hypothesis the persistence of the key interest rates 
reflects the response of central Banks to slow cyclical fluctuations in macroeconomic 
driving variables. Thus, inertia in the dynamics key Central Banks interest rate may reflect 
inertia in the economy itself (see, e.g., Rudebush, 2002; 2005, Cobham 2003, Gerlach-
Kristen, 2004, and Carrillo et al., 2007).  
On the other hand, authors like Roszbach (1997), Goodhart (1999), Sach (2000) 
Bernanke (2004), and Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012) defend an intrinsic view of 
interest rate smoothing, by showing that the degree of gradualism typical found in the 
data cannot be fully explained by the dynamic structure of the economy. In fact, evidence 
                                                             
15 Lowe and Ellis (1997) furnish evidence of official interest rates smoothing for Australia, the United 
States, the United Kingdom, Japan, and Germany. Goodhart (1998) offers evidence for France, Italy, 
Canada, Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, and Austria. See also Roszback (1997) for the case of 
Sweden.        
16 The slow adjustment of key Central Bank interest rates has been also referred in the literature as partial 
adjustment, monetary policy inertia or gradualism (see Bernanke, 2004).   
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suggest that Central Banks deliberate desire to smooth the key interest rate, in addition to 
what would be justified by existence of serial correlation in the fundamental variables. 
This observation immediately suggest the presence of adjustment costs of interest 
rate change.17 According to this explanation, a Central Bank with quadratic preferences 
incurs in convex and non-convex costs of changing the target interest rate. In this case, 
and in line with Roszbach (1997) the loss function may be written as:  
 
ܮ൫ߨത௝,௧ ,ݔ௧,∆݅௧  ൯ = ଵଶ ቂ൫ߨത௝,௧ − ߨ∗൯ଶ + ߣݔ௧ଶ + ߚ (∆݅௧)ଶ + ܿܫ௧ቃ, 
With ܫ௧ = ൜1 ݂݅ ∆݅௧ ≠ 00 ݂݅ ∆݅௧ = 0                                                                              (4) 
 
In this setting, Central Banks face a trade-off between quadratic losses arising from 
deviations of fundamentals from their targets, ൫ߨത௝,௧ − ߨ∗൯ଶ + ߣݔ௧ଶ, and losses resulting 
from changes in target interest rate, with costs having a convex, ߚ (∆݅௧)ଶ, and a non-
convex component, ܿܫ௧ (see, Roszbach, 1997, and Eijffinger et al., 1999).  
This theoretical framework is able to reproduce the stylized facts typical found in 
the data concerning Central Banks’ key interest rate changes.18  
On one hand, due to the presence of non-convex adjustment costs, Central Banks 
do not change the target interest rate when the optimal frictionless rate (in the absence of 
adjustment costs) change is small. Central Banks change the interest rate only when the 
losses from deviation of the interest rate from the desired level are bigger than the costs 
of changing the interest rate. Thus, the dynamic path of key interest rate exhibit long 
periods of inaction and discrete adjustment. 
On the other hand, because of the presence convex-adjustment costs, when Central 
Banks start to change the interest rate toward the desired level, they typically do so in a 
                                                             
17 Note that a high significant partial adjustment coefficient, ߩ, in Equation (3) may reflect serially 
correlated or persistent fundamental determinants and possibly the omission of other relevant variables 
(such as assets prices, market volatility, liquidity and credit conditions), and thus compatible with the 
extrinsic hypothesis, but it is also compatible with the desire of the Central Bank to adjust gradually the 
key inters rate, because of the presence of adjustment costs, and thus reflecting the intrinsic hypothesis (see 
Rudebush, 2002; 2005).      
18 An alternative would be to consider a zone quadratic loss function where the Central Bank only change 
the interest rate when inflation rate is outside a given range, in line with Orphanides and Vieland (2000) 
and Tachibana (2008). Although this specification is able to produce some of the features of the target 
interest rate dynamics – notably inertia, it is not fully capable of explain the almost absence of interest rate 
reversals observed in the data.      
9 
 
succession of small steps in the same direction, exhibiting gradualism and persistence 
(see Guthrie and Wright, 2004).     
In the context of the intrinsic view, the literature mentions at least four sources of 
target interest rate adjustment costs. 
Firstly, by changing key policy rates smoothly, Central Banks reduce excessive 
reactions in financial markets that might cause financial instability (see, e.g., Goodfriend, 
1991, Roszbach, 1997, Mowe and Ellis, 1997, Bernanke, 2004, and Stein and Sunderam, 
2015). For example, gradual adjustment of the key policy rate gives time to commercial 
banks to adjust to changes in the cost of short-term funding, and for that reason it may 
increase the stability of bank profits. It may also reduce financial stress for households 
with adjustable-rate mortgages and business dependent of short-term financing (see 
Bernanke, 2004). In addition, less variable short-term interest rates also reduce the risk 
the policy rate reachs the zero lower bound, reducing stress in the financial system 
(Bernanke, 2004). Note that, at least part of these costs are fixed reflecting the fact that 
even a small target change can unsettle marks (Guthrie and Wright, 2004)     
Secondly, by adjusting key interest rates gradually central Banks increase their 
ability to affect long-term interest rates and consequently influence the economy. In fact, 
a change in key interest rates induces changes not only in the current short-term market 
interest rates, but also signals the market that interest rates are likely to continue to change 
in same direction for some time. Thus, it affects long-term interest rates, and consequently 
the level of economic activity and inflation, increasing the effectiveness of monetary 
policy (see, e.g., Goodfriend, 1991, Goodhart, 1999, Woodford, 1999; 2003, Sachs and 
Wieland, 2000, and Bernanke, 2004). 
Thirdly, Central Banks move interest rates slowly in order to avoid frequent key 
interest rates reversals, as it can be interpreted as reflection of a lack of understanding or 
control over the economy, and thus affecting its credibility (see, e.g., Lowe and Ellies, 
1997, and Goodhart, 1999). 
Finally, inertia in the dynamic adjustment of Central Banks’ key interest rates may 
also be associated with the characteristics of Central Bank governance, including 
institutional rigidities, and sociological and political influences that affects the decision 
making process (see, e.g., Riboni and Ruge-Murcia, 2010, and Favaretto and Masciandro, 
2016).     
Adding to these costs of adjusting the interest rate that are incorporated in the 
Central Banks´ loss function, there is the effect of uncertainty surrounding monetary 
10 
 
policy decisions. The literature distinguishes three types of uncertainty (see, e.g., Cateau, 
2010, and Mendes et al., 2017 for a survey).  
Firstly, Central Banks face uncertainty about the economic model that is used to 
inform monetary policy decisions. This concerns to: a) general model uncertainty, when 
monetary authorities ignore the correct specification of the ‘true’ structural model of the 
economy and the variables that should be included in the model (see, e.g., Onatski and 
Stocks, 2002, and Svensson, 2004); b) model parameters magnitude uncertainty, when 
monetary authorities know the structural equations that characterize the economy, but 
face uncertainty concerning the parameter values that must be estimated using statistical 
techniques that are subjected to error (see, e.g., Brainard, 1967, and Martin and Salmon 
1999); and c) the identification of the shocks, including uncertainty about the serial 
correlation properties of shocks (see, e.g., Onatski and Williams, 2003).      
Secondly, there is uncertainty about the state of the economy related to the quality 
of the data implying that a gradual adjustment of the key interest rate may be the optimal 
response of monetary policy (see, e.g., Sack, 2000, Rudebush, 2001, Smets, 2002, 
Orphanides, 2003, and Bernanke, 2004). This result either because some variables, such 
as the GDP, are only available with some time lag and frequently subjected to revisions, 
or because some other variables, such as the output gap and the natural interest rate, are 
unobservable, being the results sensitive to the method of estimation. 
Thirdly, uncertainty (of knightian kind) arises due to unforeseen developments, 
economic and geopolitical shocks, and natural disasters (Mendes et al., 2017).  
 
 
4. A MODEL OF KEY INTEREST RATES CHANGE FOR THE EURO AREA 
 
4.1 Empirical Evidence on Key Interest Rates Change 
 
The analysis of the dynamics of the ECB official interest rate in the period from 
January 1999 to December 2017 exposes the following stylised facts.19    
First, the ECB makes changes in the key interest rate at discrete intervals and in 
discrete amounts, despite changes in the dynamic behaviour of the economy (see Figure 
                                                             
19 We use monthly data from the ECB and EUROSTAT. Data covers the period from January 1999 to 
December 2017.  
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1). In fact, ECB key interest rate (MRO) changes relatively infrequently – it didn´t change 
at all in 81% of the periods under analyse (see Table 1). 
 By simple visual inspection of the histogram of the key interest rate change 
(Figure 2 a.) and the histogram of the changes in the fundamentals (Figure 2 b., c., and 
d.) we can conclude that the shape of the distribution of the key interest rate change differs 
markedly from the distributions of changes in fundamental variables. In particular, 
compared with the distribution of monthly key interest rate change, the distributions of 
changes in fundamentals exhibit a much lower frequency of episodes of zero change and 
a greater incidence of large variations. Moreover, the frequency of interest rate changes 
has declined in the post-crisis period. Thus, the preliminary evidence do not favour the 
extrinsic inertia hypothesis.  
Second, the distribution of the key interest rate changes is clustered around a 
handful of values regardless the sign (see Figure 2 a.). When the key interest rate is 
changed, the change is generally made in multiples of quarters of a percentage point. The 
most common change (positive or negative) is a quarter of a percentage point, the 
maximum positive change is an half of a percentage point, and the maximum negative 
change three fourths of a percentage point (see also Table 1). 
Third, the size of the change does depend on the sign of the change - decreases 
tend to be bigger on averages than increases (see Table 1). 
Fourth, when the ECB changes its key interest rate it tends to adjust incrementally 
in a series of small steps in the same direction – gradual adjustments characterize periods 
of key interest rate increases as well as periods of decreases. This leads to a kind of an 
interest rate cycle. Thus, the key interest series exhibit positive autocorrelation.   
Fifth, a change of a given sign is unlikely to be followed by a change of opposite 
sign. Indeed, for the total sample of the positive key interest rate changes, 83% were 
directly followed by inaction, and 17% were directly followed by another increase, while 
0% were followed by a decrease (see Table 3).20 Of the negative key interest rate changes, 
70% were directly followed by inaction, and 30% were directly followed by another 
decrease, while 0% were followed by an increase. This smoothing behaviour is also 
documented by the high ratio of continuations to reversals (see Table 2). Moreover, ECB 
                                                             
20 To distinguish between these two types of adjustment costs, in each period interest rates changes were 
classified in three regimes: inaction (∆݅௞೟షభ = 0); positive change (∆݅௞೟షభ > 0); and negative change 
(∆݅௞೟షభ < 0). This information was then used to compute the probabilities of transition between regimes in 
two consecutive periods of time (probability transition matrix).   
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leaves the key interest rate unchanged for a relative long time before moving it in the 
opposite direction. In fact, the average duration before continuations is lower than the 
average duration before reversals (see Table 2).  
The fact that the ECB does not change the key interest rate in a continuous way in 
response to new information concerning the fundamentals, acting discontinuously when 
the accumulation of changes in the fundamentals become sufficiently large, is compatible 
with the presence of non-convex costs of interest rate adjustment and uncertainty 
regarding future developments of inflation and economic activity. Moreover, as 
documented by Sack (2000) continuations seem to constitute adjustments within a single 
policy movement, while reversals may instead imply a new policy action. This is a sign 
that convex costs of interest rate adjustment are also present. 
The presence of mixed signs of convex and non-convex target interest rate 
adjustment costs is also documented in Table 3. On the one hand, there is a great 
percentage of no adjustment (82%) and a high probability that changes should be followed 
by inaction (see the first column of the probability transition matrix). On the other hand, 
the main diagonal exhibits large serial correlation between positive and negative 
adjustments, which indicates that the ECB spread the adjustment over more than one 
period ahead.              
Different structures of adjustment costs have different consequences in terms of 
the serial correlation of interest rate adjustment (see Guthrie and Wright, 2004). Convex 
adjustment costs imply that one period of small adjustment should be followed by another 
period of small adjustment, as the Central Bank tries to spread the whole adjustment over 
several periods. This partial adjustment dynamics can be captured by the introduction in 
the monetary reaction function of the lagged valued of the key interest rate. On the 
contrary, non-convex adjustment costs imply that one period of adjustment should be 
followed by periods of inaction. In this case the dynamics is better described by 
hysteresis-type models (see, e.g., Visitin 1994, and Mayergoyz, 2003).   
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Figure 1. ECB Key Interest Rates 
 
 
Source: ECB 
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Figure 2. Key Interest Rates Changes Histogram  
(Time span:1999:01-2017:12) 
 
 
a. Interest Rates Changes 
 
 
b. HIPC Drift Changes 
 
 
c. Unemployment Gap Changes 
 
d. M3 Changes 
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Table 1. Key Interest Rates (MRO) Changes  
(Time span:1999:01-2017:12) 
 
Period Months 
Changes 
Average Change 
(Mode) 
MAX Change MIN Change 
Total ∆ܫ௞೟ > 0 ∆ܫ௞೟ < 0 Total ∆ܫ௞೟ > 0 ∆ܫ௞೟ < 0 ∆ܫ௞೟ > 0 ∆ܫ௞೟ < 0 ∆ܫ௞೟ > 0 ∆ܫ௞೟ < 0 
To
ta
l S
am
pl
e 
1999:01-2017:12 228 41 18 23 0.32* (0.25*) 
0.28 
(0.25) 
-0.35 
(-0.25) 
0.5 -0.75 0.25 -0.05 
Pr
e-
Cr
isi
s 
1999:01-2007:07 104 23 15 8 
0.33* 
(0.25)* 
0.28 
(0.25) 
-0.41 
(-0.5) 
0.5 
 
-0.5 0.25 -0.25 
Po
st-
Cr
isi
s 
2007:08-2017:12 124 18 3 15 
0.32* 
(0.25) 
0.28 
(0.25) 
-0.25 
(0.25) 
0.5 -0.75 0.25 -0.05 
*in absolute values  
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Table 2. Key Interest Rates Average Durations 
(Time span:1999:01-2017:12) 
 
Period  
Average Duration Following: 
(Max Duration Following :) 
Duration Before: Ratio of 
Continuations 
to Reversals ∆ܫ௞೟ ≠ 0 ∆ܫ௞೟ > 0 ∆ܫ௞೟ < 0 Continuations* Reversals* + + −− + − − + 
To
ta
l S
am
pl
e 
1999:01-
2017:12 
Occurrences 41 19 23 12 18 3 3 
5.0 Average 4 2.2 5.7 2.5 3.6 3.7 19 
Maximum 29 12 29 12 17 6 29 
Pr
e-
Cr
isi
s 
1999:01-
2007:07 
Occurrences 23 15 8 10 5 1 2 
5.0 Average 3.6 1.6 6.8 1.6 3.8 6 17.5 
Maximum 29 6 29 2 12 6 29 
Po
st-
Cr
isi
s 
2007:08-
2017:12 
Occurrences 18 3 15 2 13 2 1 
5.0 Average 4.6 4.3 5.1 6.5 3.5 2.5 22 
Maximum 22 10 22 11 17 3 22 
*Consecutive and Non-Consecutive 
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Table 3. Key Interest Rates (MRO) Prob. Transition Matrices 
 
Total Sample: 1999:01-2017:12 
 
% of the total observations Prob. Transition Matrix 
 ∆ܫ௞೟షభ = 0 ∆ܫ௞೟షభ > 0 ∆௞೟షభ< 0 
∆ܫ௞೟షభ = 0 67% 7% 7% 
∆ܫ௞೟షభ > 0 7% 1% 0% 
∆ܫ௞೟షభ < 0 7% 0% 3% 
 
 ∆ܫ௞೟షభ = 0 ∆ܫ௞೟షభ > 0 ∆௞೟షభ< 0 
∆ܫ௞೟షభ = 0 82% 9% 9% 
∆ܫ௞೟షభ > 0 83% 17% 0% 
∆ܫ௞೟షభ < 0 70% 0% 30% 
 
 
 
Pre-Crisis: 1999:01-2007:07 
 
% of the total observations Prob. Transition Matrix 
 ∆ܫ௞೟షభ = 0 ∆ܫ௞೟షభ > 0 ∆௞೟షభ< 0 
∆ܫ௞೟షభ = 0 59% 12% 7% 
∆ܫ௞೟షభ > 0 12% 3% 0% 
∆ܫ௞೟షభ < 0 7% 0% 1% 
 
 ∆ܫ௞೟షభ = 0 ∆ܫ௞೟షభ > 0 ∆௞೟షభ< 0 
∆ܫ௞೟షభ = 0 76% 15% 9% 
∆ܫ௞೟షభ > 0 80% 20% 0% 
∆ܫ௞೟షభ < 0 88% 0% 13% 
 
 
 
Post-Crisis: 2007:08-2017:12 
 
% of the total observations Prob. Transition Matrix 
 ∆ܫ௞೟షభ = 0 ∆ܫ௞೟షభ > 0 ∆௞೟షభ< 0 
∆ܫ௞೟షభ = 0 72% 3% 8% 
∆ܫ௞೟షభ > 0 3% 0% 0% 
∆ܫ௞೟షభ < 0 8% 0% 5% 
 
 ∆ܫ௞೟షభ = 0 ∆ܫ௞೟షభ > 0 ∆௞೟షభ< 0 
∆ܫ௞೟షభ = 0 87% 3% 10% 
∆ܫ௞೟షభ > 0 100% 0% 0% 
∆ܫ௞೟షభ < 0 60% 0% 40% 
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4.2 The Model and the Empirical Strategy 
 
We assume that monetary policy not only aim to stabilize inflation, but also put 
some weight on stabilizing the real economy.  
As considered in the first pillar of the monetary strategy, the ECB looks for a 
variety of shocks that affect the economy with potential impact on price stability, not all 
of them resulting from demand side factors. Thus, inflation pressures are not entirely the 
result of the state of demand. For that reason we add to equation the unemployment gap. 
Due to the role for money advocated by the second pillar of the ECB strategy, we include 
also the low-frequency component of M3 growth. Indeed for the ECB (2011, p. 78), the 
low-frequency component of M3 growth moves closely in line with the low-frequency 
component of inflation, and developments in trend money growth tend to systematically 
lead developments in trend inflation (see also Surico, 2003, and Hofmann, 2008). We also 
include in the model a proxy of financial markets stress, in line with Rudebush (2002; 
2005), Gerlach-Kristen (2004), and Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012). For example, 
Gerlach-Kristen (2004) defend that Central Bank key interest rates tend to be lowered by 
more than inflation and output gap in periods of financial stress. To provide a more 
accurate representation of the time delay with which information becomes available to 
policymakers, we consider a one-month information lag.    
Accordingly, hour baseline specification for the frictionless ECB desired interest 
rate based on fundamentals, ݅௧∗, is: 
 
݅௧
∗ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵ൫ ௧ܲ − ௧ܲ,௝∗ ൯ିଵ + ߚଶܷܩܣ ௧ܲିଵ + ߚଷܯ3௧ିଵ + ߚସܴܵܲܧܣܦ௧ିଵ              (5)   
With ௧ܲ,௝∗ = ௧ܲି௝ ቀ1 + ଴.଴ଶଵଶ ቁ௝  
                                                              
Where ௧ܲ is the harmonized consumer price index; ௧ܲ,௝∗  is the desired price level path for 
the window ݆; ܷܩܣ ௧ܲ is the unemployment gap constructed as the Hodrick-Prescott 
detrended component of the unemployment rate,21 ܯ3௧ିଵ is the moving average over 6 
months of the broad monetary aggregate M3, and ܴܵܲܧܣܦ௧ is the average spread 
between Euro Zone treasury bonds with maturity of 10 years and the correspondent 
Germany bonds.   
                                                             
21 We consider the standard smoothness parameter of 14400 for monthly data. 
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To shed some light about the ‘medium run’ concept referred by the ECB, we 
search for the value of ݆ that maximizes the goodness of fit of a model of key interest 
rates determination by the ECB (Equation 5). We considered a grid of values for ݆  ranging 
from ݆ = 1 month to ݆ = 150 months, with increments of six months. 
To allow for a possible structural break due to recent financial crisis, we reestimate 
Equation 5 with an additive and multiplicative dummy variable, ܦ௧, that takes the value 
of one for all the months after the failure of Lehman Brothers, and zero in the other 
months.      
 So far we assumed a linear relationship between the official interest rates and 
fundamentals. Now we consider, in line with Checchetti (1996), Lowe and Ellis (1997) 
and Roszbach (1997), and Guthrie and Wright (2004) that there are convex and non-
convex costs involved in reversing the direction of the target interest rate. The presence 
of non-convex target interest rate adjustment costs is sufficient to generate hysteresis.22  
Thus we estimate a hysteretic version of Equation (5) based on the linear play 
model of hysteresis.23    
As we are considering that the ECB maximizes a set of secondary objectives such 
as output stabilization and financial markets stability subject to the constraint that it 
achieves a price level at a given horizon in the future, i.e. flexible average inflation 
targeting, as in Smets (2000), we assume that the price level is the only hysteretic variable.        
The linear play model is implemented empirically via a linear switching key 
interest rate equation with an unknown splitting factor - the ܲܮܣܻ.24 
Following Belke and Göcke (2001), we describe the change in current key interest 
rate ݅௧, induced by a change in  ൫ ௧ܲ − ௧ܲ,௝∗ ൯, as divided between a weak reaction along a 
play line when the change in ൫ ௧ܲ − ௧ܲ,௝∗ ൯ is small and a strong reaction along a spurt line, 
when ൫ ௧ܲ − ௧ܲ,௝∗ ൯ changes sufficiently, and we estimate the following equation:25 
 
 ݅௧ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵ ൫ ௧ܲ − ௧ܲ,௝∗ ൯ିଵ + ߚଶܷܴܵܲ ௧ܶିଵ + ߚଶܩܣ ௧ܲିଵ + ߚଷܯ3௧ିଵ + ߚସܴܵܲܧܣܦ௧ିଵ 
(6) 
                                                             
22 Hysteresis is the property of a mathematical system whereby some temporary exogenous shocks can have 
permanent effects. 
23 See Visitin (1996) for a general description of the model. 
24 The term is used due to its analogy to play in mechanics. 
25 The details of the empirical implementation of the play model (in the case of the dynamics of 
employment) can be found in Belke and Göcke (2001) and in Mota et al. (2015). 
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Where ܷܴܵܲ ௧ܶ (the spurt variable) results from the  ൫ ௧ܲ − ௧ܲ,௝∗ ൯ series with all small 
changes ൣ∆ ൫ ௧ܲ − ௧ܲ,௝∗ ൯ < ܲܮܣܻ൧ filtered out. In this framework, ߚଵ gives the reaction of 
key interest rate, ݅௧, along the play line, while ߚଶ is the difference of the reaction of ݅௧  
along the spurt line and the play line caused by changes in fundamentals. 
The test for the presence of hysteresis consists of checking the ability of the 
hysteretic transformed input variable, ܷܴܵܲ ௧ܶ, to explain the observed key policy rate 
dynamics. The strategy is to test whether the non-linear model, which includes hysteresis, 
provides better results than the linear one, by looking to the significance of the 
transformed ൫ ௧ܲ − ௧ܲ,௝∗ ൯ - hysteresis implies ߚଶ > 0 in Equation (6). 
Following the algorithm described in Belke and Göcke (2001), a MATLAB 
program to generate the spurt variable, ܷܴܵܲ ௧ܶ was developed and implemented, which 
in turn requires the estimation of the ܲܮܣܻ width. 
As a new feature, we estimate the model allowing for possible structural changes 
in the value of the switching parameter due to the different stages of the financial crisis. 
 
 
5. ESTIMATION RESULTS 
 
We start by applying the Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test to find the order 
of integration of the series. Table 4 shows the augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic for 
the levels and for the first difference of the variables. For the majority of the variables in 
levels the augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic is larger than the 5% critical value (-
2.874)indicating that we do not reject the presence of a unit root. The hypothesis of 
stationarity of the first difference of the series is rejected fore some vriables meaning that 
not all the series are integrated of order one, I(1).    
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Table 4: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Statistics (5% critical value: -2.874) 
 
Variable  Level 1st Difference  
 ௧ܲ − ௧ܲ,௝∗  
݆ = 1 -2.319 -9.242 
݆ = 6 -2.383 -9.514 
݆ = 12 -2.293 -12.447 
݆ = 18 -3.772 -2.430 
݆ = 24 -1.623 -11.317 
݆ = 30 -3.237 -2.447 
݆ = 36 -0.962 -11.304 
݆ = 42 -2.490 -2.106 
݆ = 48 0.0477 -12.323 
݆ = 54 -0.498 -2.682 
݆ = 60 0.660 -3.852 
݆ = 66 -0.605 -2.039 
݆ = 72 0.025 -3.728 
݆ = 78 0.079 -2.796 
݆ = 84 -0.446 -3.334 
݆ = 90 -1.064 -2.324 
݆ = 96 -0.598 -3.290 
݆ = 102 -3.075 -1.697 
݆ = 108 -1.045 -2.722 
݆ = 114 0.437 -1.395 
݆ = 120 0.172 -1.760 
݆ = 126 -0.920 -1.504 
݆ = 132 -1.089 -2.069 
݆ = 138 -0.404 -2.100 
݆ = 144 -0.915 -1.290 
݆ = 150 -1.171 -1.435 
ܩܣ ௧ܲ -2.820 -6.315 
ܯ3௧ -2.669 -3.367 
ܴܵܲܧܣܦ௧ -1.756 -14.021 
ܷܴܵܲ ௧ܶ  -0.690 -3.196 
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To rule out the possibility of a spurious regression and to verify the existence of a 
true equilibrium relationship between the variables we test for the existence of 
cointegration using the Johansen Test Procedure.26   
By applying the Johansen cointegrating test the hypothesis of a single 
cointegrating vector relating the variables is not rejected. We report the trace test statistic 
of the cointegrting equation that includes the series ൫ ௧ܲ − ௧ܲ,௝∗ ൯ that maximises the R2 of 
the interest rate equation (see Table 5).27 
However, because the series are non-stationary, to obtain asymptotically unbiased 
estimates of the parameters, we estimate the cointegrating Equation (5) by Fully Modified 
Least Squares (FM-OLS), as proposed by Phillips and Hansen (1990), which is an 
asymptotically efficient direct estimator of long-run economic equilibrium relationships. 
This method modifies least squares with smiparameyric corrections that account for serial 
correlation effects and for endogeneity in the regressors that result from the existence of 
cointegrating relatioinships.   
We estimate equation 5 for different values of  ݆ ranging from ݆ = 1 month to ݆ =150 months, with increments of six months. Figure 3 shows the R2 of the regression for 
each value of ݆ . The maximum R2 is reached for ݆ = 84 months, implying that seven years 
is the length of the medium term concept for the ECB, at least at is being achieved in 
practice.  
The results of the estimation of equation 5 (for ݆ = 84) by FM-OLS are in Table 
5 (column 2). All the regressors are statistical significant at the normal level of 5%, and 
the associated coefficients have the expected signal. The ECB´s target interest rate reacts 
positively to the deviation of the price level from the desired path, negatively to the 
unemployment gap, and to the average spread between Euro Zone treasury bonds with 
maturity of 10 years and the correspondent Germany bonds, and positively to the low 
frequency component of M3.  
 Table 5 (column 3) displays the results of the estimation when we consider the 
possibility of a structural break in October 2008. The estimates are relatively stable. The 
only significant difference is that the proxy of financial distress (ܴܵܲܧܣܦ௧) only has an 
impact on the target interest rate after the failure of Lehman Brothers.   
                                                             
26 We apply the Trace Test performed with four lags in the VAR representation and with an intercept and 
time trend in the cointegration equation. We report the results of testing the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration (r=0) against the existence of at least one cointegrated vector (r).  
27 Note that all the variables in Table 5 are I(1).   
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Figure 3: R2 of the ECB Target Interest Equation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Results of the estimation by FMOLS (Dependent variable: Key ECB interest rate) 
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Variable 
Model I 
(baseline) 
Model II 
(structural 
break: 
2008:010) 
Model III 
(hysteresis, structural break of 
the switching parameter in: 
2007:09; 2008:10; and 2011:01) 
 ܿ݋݊ݏݐ  
1.693*** 
(8.405) 
1.191*** 
(8.989) 
1.431*** 
(6.568) 
 ൫ ௧ܲ − ௧ܲ,଼ସ∗ ൯ିଵ 0.322*** (19.861) 0.213*** (3.078) 0.098 (1.135) 
ܪ൫ ௧ܲିଵ − ௧ܲିଵ,଼ସ∗ ൯ - - 0.225** (2.601) 
ܷܩܣ ௧ܲି.ଵ -0.905*** (-6.387) -0.997*** (-3.955) -0.920*** (-6.706) 
ܯ3ܴܶܧܰܦ௧ିଵ 0.121*** (5.269) 0.181*** (10.489) 0.118*** (5.335) 
ܴܵܲܧܣܦ௧ିଵ 
-0.705*** 
(-6.253) 
0.0553 
(0.015) 
-0.712*** 
(-6.519) 
൫ ௧ܲ − ௧ܲ,଼ସ∗ ൯ିଵ × ܦݐ - 0.0592  (0.829) - 
ܷܩܣ ௧ܲି.ଵ × ܦ௧ - 0.325 (1.195) - 
ܯ3ܴܶܧܰܦ௧ିଵ × ܦ௧ - -0.104*** (-5.229) - 
ܴܵܲܧܣܦ௧ିଵ × ܦ௧ - -0.234 (-0.065) - 
ܴଶ 0.9498 0.9551  9.954 
Trace Test Statistic+ 
82.232 
(critical value 
5%: 69.82) 
  137.77 (critical value 5%: 95.75) 
 
t-statistics are in parentheses. 
 ***, **,* Significant at 1, 5, and 10 per cent respectively. 
 
 
Finally, we estimate a switching target interest rate equation by applying the play 
model of hysteresis (equation 7).  
Figure  4 exhibits the estimated values of the switching parameter (the play), 
obtained through the process of grid search over the set of admissible values described in 
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the previous section. The width of the switching parameter is a proxy of an inaction band 
associated to the target interest rate.28 Figure 4 shows that the width of the inaction band 
decreased after the crisis, and in particular after the beginning of the Eurozone debt crises, 
implying that the target intrest rate become more responsive to fundamentals.      
 
Figure 4: Switching Parameter 
.00
.04
.08
.12
.16
.20
.24
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016  
 
The estimates of the employment elasticity along the play lines, ߚଵ, and the 
increment of this same elasticity along the spurt lines, ߚଶ, are displayed in Table 5 
(colunm 4). The employment elasticity along the spurt lines is given by ߚଵ + ߚଶ.  
Applying a fully-modified Wald test, which uses conventional chi-squared criteria 
for inferential purposes with respect to the coefficients, we find that ߚଶ is significant, 
while ߚଵ is non-significant. The results indicate that the reaction along the play line is 
non-significant, while the reaction along the spurt line is positive and strongly significant. 
This implies that interest rate change requires sufficiently large shock in  ൫ ௧ܲ − ௧ܲ,଼ସ∗ ൯ିଵ.  
The coefients associated to the other fundamental variable are relatively stable 
compared with the estimations of the previous models, and the signs are the expected.      
 
 
                                                             
28 The concept is analogous to the employment band of inaction (see Mota et al. 2015).  
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
We have found that the ECB is not following a pure price-targeting neither a pure 
inflation target, but instead an ‘average inflation target,’ by which the objective is to 
stabilize average inflation measured over seven years. This corresponds in practice with 
the medium run orientation of monetary policy followed by the ECB.  
These findings are in line with some theoretical literature. For example Smets 
(2000) using a forward-looking model of the Euro Zone Economy found that when output 
gap and inflation have equal weights in the Central Bank’s loss function the optimal 
horizon for price level objective is six years, i.e., it may extends over a full business cycle. 
Batini and Nelson (2001) reaches an optimal horizon for inflation objective in between 
eight to 19 quarters. Smets (2003) reports an optimal horizon for price level objective of 
eight years. Finally, Akran (2010) indicates an optimal horizon of six to eight years for 
price level objective 
In this paper target interest rate inertia is considered by means of the estimation 
of a switching employment equation based on the play model of hysteresis. 
We have found also significant hysteresis effects in the dynamics of the ECB key 
interest rate, reflecting the presence of non-convex costs of interest rate adjustment and 
uncertainty.  
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